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TOWARD THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANTS PREARREST
SILENCE
INTRODUCTION
Consider this prototypical scenario. Police investigators ar-
rive at the home of John Doe to ask him what he knows about
a recent string of burglaries in his neighborhood. The investi-
gators remind Doe of his prior burglary convictions, and ask
him if he was in the neighborhood on the nights in question.
Doe says to the investigators: "I don't have to tell you any-
thing. rm not afraid of you, don't think I'm scared of you
guys." A week later, investigators make another visit to Doe's
home and ask him if he has been keeping out of trouble recent-
ly. They also ask whether he was with Mr. X, a local convicted
burglar and Doe's sometime friend, on the nights in question.
Doe tells the investigators: "I don't have a lawyer and rm not
talking to you guys."
Doe is later arrested and charged with the burglaries, and
does not take the stand at trial. During direct examination,
both of the investigators who spoke to Doe at his home tell the
court that Doe refused to talk to them before he was arrested.
During closing argument, the prosecutor comments on Doe's
refusal to speak to the police prior to his arrest. Doe is convict-
ed by a jury, and appeals on grounds that the admission of
evidence of his "prearrest silence" violated his Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.
You are a Ninth Circuit Judge hearing the appeal.1 Does
your decision to reverse the conviction turn on whether Doe
himself believed that he was invoking his privilege against
self-incrimination? Whether Doe used certain words to invoke
1 In United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to find comment on a defendants prearrest silence plain error 'be-
cause of the circuit split, the lack of controlling authority, and the fact that there
is at least some room for doubt about the outcome of this issue.' Id. at 856.
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it and not others? Are you reluctant to apply Fifth Amendment
principles at all because the silence at issue occurred before
Doe had been arrested and read his Miranda rights?
The United States Supreme Court has expressly declined
to address whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination2 prohibits the State from using evidence of a
non-testifying defendant's prearrest silence in its case-in-
chief.3 However, circuit courts are split on this question, with
both sides of the split relying on Supreme Court precedent to
either prohibit or permit this trial practice.
The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held that the
use of a non-testifying defendant's prearrest silence violates
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.4 Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that
prearrest silence cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-
chief but found any assumed error to be harmless.5 These cir-
cuits consistently rely on the seminal case of Griffin v. Califor-
nia,' where the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment "forbids either comment by the prosecution
on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt."7 Under the Griffin facts, however,
the Supreme Court merely prohibited comment on the
accused's silence occuring at trial, not before arrest. Therefore,
the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits' protection of prearrest
silence from the prosecution's case-in-chief is not required by
the Griffin holding.
More recently, the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have ruled
that comment on prearrest silence is constitutional.' The Elev-
2 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no per-
son "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
' Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2 (1980). The case-in-chief is that
part of the trial in which the party with the initial burden of proof presents evi-
dence and after which that party rests. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1866, at 655
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).
" See, e.g., United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991);
Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989); Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d
1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987).
' United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 874-76 (2d Cir. 1981).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7 Id. at 615.
" United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
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enth Circuit relies on Jenkins v. Anderson,9 where the United
States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may use a testi-
fying defendant's prearrest silence to impeach him." Similar-
ly, the Fifth Circuit recently held that where the defendant's
silence is "neither induced by nor a response to any action by a
governmental agent," the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable.1
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have improperly extended
the holding and reasoning of Jenkins to circumstances where
defendants have availed themselves of the constitutional right
not to testify at trial. Such an extension ignores the pervasive
federal and state evidentiary rules that distinguish between
comment on privileged silence to impeach a defendant's testi-
mony, and comment on a defendant's silence as substantive
evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief.' These
circuits fundamentally misconstrue the explicit reasoning be-
hind the Jenkins Court's unwillingness to extend protection to
a testifying defendant's prearrest silence: "impeachment fol-
lows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of
silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal
trial."13 Where a defendant chooses not to testify, the Jenkins
holding should not apply.
This Note will advocate the exclusion from the
prosecutions case-in-chief of all silence occuring during any
prearrest investigation by a state agent on the grounds that
such silence is privileged under the self-incrimination clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consitution. Part I
of this Note outlines and contextualizes the constitutional
development of a defendant's right to silence and reviews the
Court's rationale for protecting a defendant's silence in con-
texts analogous to the circumstances at issue in this Note. Part
H summarizes the circuit court decisions which have applied
Supreme Court precedent to the prearrest setting. Part i
9 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
'0 I& at 240-41.
U Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593.
' As discussed infra, courts 'generally assume that privileged silence cannot be
used [in the Prosecution's case-in-chiefl to establish guilt, but are more willing to
permit impeachment use of privileged silence." Anne Bowen Poulin, Euldentiary
Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Sdf-Incrimination, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1984).
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239.
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concludes that the most closely analogous Supreme Court hold-
ings suggest that a non-testifying defendant's prearrest silence
is as protected from the prosecution's case-in-chief as if the
silence had occurred following arrest and the reading of
Miranda rights. Finally, Part IV of this Note suggests that
while prearrest silence occurring during contact with a state
agent should be constitutionally protected from the
prosecution's case-in-chief, prearrest silence not resulting from
contact with law enforcement should remain subject to applica-
ble federal and state evidentiary rules.14
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF SILENCE
A. The Purpose of the Self-Incrimination Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."5 When judging the impact of
state action on the privilege against self-incrimination, it is
important first to understand the purposes underlying the
clause.16 However, there is a well-recognized lack of consensus
on the policies behind this Fifth Amendment right."7 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion" listed a number of the reasons for the privilege that
will be helpful for purposes of this Note:
[the privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most
1' In Jenkins the court removed from the ambit of Constitutional mandate the
issue of impeachment use of prearrest silence. The Court, however, stated that
"[elach jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situa-
tions in which silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial." Id. at 240.
Likewise, this Note advocates only Constitutional protection of prearrest silence
arising during contact with a state agent.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
11 Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Si-
lence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 848-52 (un-
certainty surrounding the reasons for privilege's original enactment and the pres-
ent policies justifying its continued application). See also Grano, CONFESSIONS,
TRUTH, AND THE LAW 129-36 (1993) (Miranda court "erred, at least from a his-
torical perspective, in perceiving an 'intimate connection' between the privilege ...
and the [historically distinct] issues pertaining to the admissibility of extrajudicial
confessions").
'a 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial sys-
tem of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load,' our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each indi-
vidual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,' our
distrust of self-depratory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protec-
tion to the innocent."
Over time, the United States Supreme Court has devel-
oped analytical models to give form to these aspirations. Appli-
cation of the Court's analytical models to the prearrest setting
demonstrates that these Fifth Amendment policies are thwart-
ed when the government is permitted to use a defendant's
silence occuring before arrest as substantive evidence of guilt
at trial.
B. Grifin v. California and the Analytical Models
In Griffin v. California,'0 the Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of a California statute that permitted the govern-
ment to use a defendant's failure to testify as substantive evi-
dence of guilt in a state prosecution.2' The defendant, who
was being tried for murder, chose not to testify at his trial.'
During closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on the
defendant's refusal to testify.' The Court held that, where a
19 Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id at 613.
Id at 609.
Id at 610. The prosecutor stated:
The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up ap-
pearance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley
with her.... He would know how she got down the alley. He would
know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps.... He
would know whether he beat her or mistreated her.... These things he
has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.... Essie Mae is
dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant wont.
I& at 611.
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defendant exercises his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at
trial, the self-incrimination clause "forbids either comment by
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt."'
As justification for its holding, the Griffin Court broadly
reasoned that "comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant
of the inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which the Fifth
Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privi-
lege by making its assertion costly."'
1. Impermissible-Burden Analysis
In declaring evidentiary use of a defendant's failure to
take the stand unconstitutional, the Griffin Court articulated
what has come to be known as the "impermissible-burden"
approach to Fifth Amendment analysis.2" The thrust of this
analytical model is that a defendant's constitutional right not
to testify at trial is rendered hollow-is impermissibly bur-
dened-"when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence againt him."7
Following Griffin, the Court has applied a balancing test
to determine whether a particular burden is impermissible and
therefore unconstitutional. If burdening the trial choice to
testify or not to testifef "impairs to an appreciable extent any
of the policies behind the rights involved," 9 and if a legiti-
mate government interest is not advanced sufficiently to war-
rant the degree of impairment, then the burden on the consti-
tutional right is unconstitutional."
The Griffin Court applied a burden analysis to the right to
24 Id. at 615.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
26 Poulin, supra note 12, at 205. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 238
(1980) ("[i]n determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened
impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged
governmental practice.").
27 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
' Under the Fifth Amendment, "[elvery criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971).
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
20 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
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remain silent at trial and concluded that state action--com-
ment on the exercise of the right-impermissibly burdened the
defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."' However, because the Supreme Court has never ac-
knowledged that the privilege against self-incrimination atta-
ches to the prearrest choice of silence, 2 an analysis of the
constitutionality of prosecutorial comment on prearrest silence
must take into account two variations of the impermissible-
burden test. If the prearrest choice of silence does not consti-
tute an exercise of a constitutional privilege, then burden anal-
ysis must necessarily remain focused on the defendant's choice
of trial silence ("Impermissible-Burden Test F).' Under this
test, the focus of burden inquiry remains temporally identical
to the inquiry in Griffin: whether the constitutional right to
trial silence is impermissibly burdened when the state is per-
mitted to comment on a defendant's non-privileged prearrest
refusal to speak to law enforcement.
On the other hand, if the prearrest choice not to speak to
law enforcement does indeed represent an exercise of the con-
stitutional privilege, then burden analysis may additionally
focus on whether the prearrest choice of silence is
impermissibly burdened ("Impermissible-Burden Test I"). Un-
der this test, the question posed is not temporally, but rather
analytically identical to the question posed in Griffin: whether
the state's use of a defendant's exercise of a constitutional
privilege as substantive evidence of guilt impermissibly bur-
dens the exercise of the privilege.
However, if prearrest silence is not privileged, it is unlike-
ly that the Court will declare prosecutorial comment on
prearrest silence an unconstitutional burden on the right to
trial silence. The case of McGautha v. California' illustrates
the difficulty of proving an unconstitutional burden under
Impermissible-Burden Test I.
In McGautha, a defendant challenged the constitutionality
of the single-verdict procedure to which he had been subjected
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15.
"Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
The Court has made clear that impermissible-burden analysis will be applied
only to a burdened constitutional right South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560
(1983).
"402 U.S. at 213.
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at his capital murder trial." He contended that where guilt
and punishment are to be determined by a jury at a single
trial, the desire to address the jury on punishment unduly
encourages waiver of his privilege to remain silent at trial on
the issue of guilt.3 6 The Court disagreed, holding that the fact
that the threat of the death penalty may persuade a defendant
to become a witness did not mean that the single-verdict proce-
dure unconstitutionally burdened the defendant's right not to
testify.3
Because there was no constitutional right to a bifurcated
trial, the McGautha Court applied burden analysis only to the
burdened constitutional right-namely, trial silence.' The
Court acknowledged that a defendant who wishes to save his
own life may be persuaded to forgo his right to remain silent in
order to testify as to sentencing in the event of a conviction. 9
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the state's insistence
on a single trial scheme did not unconstitutionally burden the
right to trial silence. As Part IV of this Note demonstrates,
evidentiary use of non-privileged prearrest silence is similarly
unlikely to be deemed an impermissible burden on a
defendant's right not to take the stand at trial.40
2. Coercion Analysis
The flip side of the impermissible-burden model is coercion
analysis. In his dissent in Adamson v. California,4' Justice
Murphy used the coercion model to evaluate the California
Constitution's provision, later held unconstitutional in Griffin,
that permitted the Government to comment on a defendant's
failure to testify. He stated:
[S]uch a provision [permitting comment on the failure to testify]
compels a defendant to be a witness against himself in one of two
ways: 1. If he does not take the stand, his silence is used as the
basis for drawing unfavorable inferences against him as to matters
Id. at 213, 214.
36 1&
37 Id. at 236.
"Id. at 238.
" McGautha, 402 U.S. at 238.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947).
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which he might reasonably be expected to explain. Thus he is com-
pelled, through his silence, to testify against himself And silence
can be as effective in this situation as oral statements. 2. If he does
take the stand, thereby opening himself to cross-examination, so as
to overcome the effects of the provision in question, he is necessarily
compelled to testify against himself. In that case, his testimony on
cross-examination is the result of the coercive pressure of the
privision rather than his own volition.m '
The Court has addressed coerced testimony in two concep-
tually distinct ways. The first ("Coercion Model r) is exempli-
fied by Justice Murphy's formulation in the Adamson dissent
recounted above. This model focuses on whether the
defendant's choice to remain silent at trial was coerced.' The
second coercion model ("Coercion Model I"), on the other hand,
focuses on whether the defendants statement or silence occur-
ring before trial was coerced and therefore inadmissible as
trial evidence.
There is strong indication, however, that Coercion Model I
has been subsumed by the impermissible-burden analysis. For
instance, when the California statute at issue in Adamson was
finally overruled in Griffin, the Court did not hold that eviden-
tiary use of a defendant's choice not to testify amounted to
coerced self-accusation. Instead, the Court ruled that the stat-
ute was an unconstitutional "penalty for asserting a constitu-
tional privilege." Fifteen years later, in Jenkins v. Ander-
son, the Court held that impeachment use of prearrest si-
lence did not violate the Fifth Amendment right not to testify
at trial. 6 However, the Court relied on impermissible-burden
analysis and did not refer to Justice Murphy's coercion analy-
sis.47
Coercion Model II, because it focuses on the degree of
42Ic (emphasis added).
4Id at 123.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Id. at 238.
' Id. See infra text accompanying notes 85-102 for a discussion of Jenkins. Be-
cause t]he Court... is not likely to hold that the threat of using pre-trial si-
leance as evidence is unconstitutional coercion [to testify] ... it is important to
understand that even if a burden does not rise to the level of compulsion, it may
nevertheless be constitutionally impermissible." Poulin, supra note 12, at 207-08.
Indeed, Griffin demonstrates that a burden on the Fifth Amendment privilege may
be impermissible even though it does not constitute coercion.
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coercion occurring before trial, has greater applicability to the
prearrest silence at issue in this Note. It may be argued, that
if the accused's silence during pre-trial questioning can be used
later as a statement supporting his guilt, and if his pre-trial
speech can also be used against him, then any statement, ei-
ther affirmative or by silence, is compelled.48 Therefore, "oth-
erwise voluntary statements should be excluded because the
defendant had no choice but to provide incriminating testimo-
nial evidence." 9 This "double-bind" view of compulsion, in
which you are "damned if you do, damned if you don't," is the
essence of the dilemma described in Justice Murphy's dissent
in Adamson.5 ° However, the development of the Court's coer-
cion analysis demonstrates a much narrower construction of
compulsion.
a. Coerced Pre-Trial Statements
Garrity v. New Jersey5 presents an example of inadmissi-
bly coerced pre-trial statements. The case arose when several
police officers questioned during an investigation of illegal
activity were advised that their answers might be used against
them in later criminal proceedings, and that they could refuse
to answer questions that would evoke self-incriminating re-
sponses.5 2 However, each officer was also warned that those
who refused to answer might lose their jobs.53 The officers
answered the questions, and the government later used their
statements to convict them.'4 The Court held that the
statements were a product of coercion, were not voluntary, and
should not have been admitted into evidence at the officers'
criminal trial.5
However, Miranda v. Arizona" and its subsequent inter-
pretation by the Court has dramatically limited the application
' Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interroga-
tion, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 467-68 (1964).
49 Poulin, supra note 12, at 220.
" See supra text accompanying note 42.
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
52 Id. at 494.
53 Id.
'4 Id. at 495.
'5 Id. at 497-500.
58 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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of Coercion Model ]H to pre-trial statements7 In Harris v.
New York," the Court noted that Miranda allows the govern-
ment to use custodial statements against the defendant as
substantive evidence of guilt. By advising the defendant of his
Miranda rights, the police alleviate the element of compulsion
that might otherwise preclude using any statements made in
custody as evidence in the accused's trial." Furthermore, the
Harris Court concluded that even if custodial statements are
obtained in violation of Miranda, the statements may be used
for impeachment purposes." As a matter of constitutional
law, therefore, pre-trial statements made to police following
the reading of Miranda rights are not deemed coerced.
b. Pre-trial silence: Doyle v. Ohio and estoppel analysis
The Court has also been reluctant to characterize pre-trial
silence as unconstitutionally coerced. In Doyle v. Ohio,"' the
Court for the first time invoked constitutional principles' to
prohibit the use of a defendant's postarrest, pre-trial silence.'
However, the Court departed from traditional impermissible-
Miranda requires that a person in custody be advised that 'he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so de-
sires." Id. at 479.
401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
59 Id. at 224.
Id. at 225-26
61 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
1 One year before its ruling in Doyle v. Ohio, the Court did strike down the
trial use of a defendant's post arrest, pre-trial silence in United States u. Hale,
422 U.S. 171 (1975). However, the Court relied only on its supervisory powers and
not on constitutional principles. Id. at 176. In Hale, police arrested the defendant
and advised him of his right to remain silent, which he then exercised. Id. at 174.
When the defendant testified at trial, the prosecutor cross-examined him on his
postarrest silence. Id. The Court held that the defendant's silence after his arrest
and the reading of his firanda rights was not admissible to impeach him because
his silence was not sufficiently probative of the credibility of his in-court testimo-
ny. In refusing to rely on constitutional grounds to strike down such state action,
the Hale Court side-stepped the issue of whether impeachment use of a
defendant's postarrest silence impermissibly burdens his choice to remain silent at
trial (Impermissible-Burden Test I); whether such use impermissibly coerces him to
take the stand and explain himself (Coercion Model 1); or whether his postarrest
was the product of governmental coercion (Coercion Model II).
' Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18.
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burden and coercion analyses.' As will be demonstrated, such
inconsistency has left lower courts with little guidance on the
analytical framework to apply to prearrest silence.'
In Doyle, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
State's use of post-Miranda, pre-trial silence to impeach a tes-
tifying defendant in state criminal proceedings.' The Doyle
defendants were arrested together and charged with selling ten
pounds of marijuana to a local convicted drug offender and
narcotics bureau informant.67 Shortly after the alleged drug
purchase, a narcotics agent arrested the defendants and gave
them Miranda warnings.'e
At trial, both defendants testified that the informant had
framed them.69 They claimed that the arrangement had been
for the informant to sell the defendants the ten pounds of mar-
ijuana, but when they had changed their minds, the informant
grew angry, threw the money in the defendants' car, and took
all ten pounds of the marijuana away with him. ° During
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendants why
they had not told the frame-up story to the agent when he ar-
rested them.7'
The United States Supreme Court declared that the
State's attempt to impeach a defendant with his silence follow-
ing the administration of Miranda warnings was fundamen-
tally unfair and a violation of due process.72 The Court rea-
64 Id.
"' As one commentator has noted: "The [Supreme Court] cases ... lack any
clear analysis of the constitutional basis for admitting or excluding such evidence
[of prior silence] from the case-in-chief." Poulin, supra note 12, at 197.
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611.
67Id.
Id. at 612.
s' Id. at 613.
o Id.
7' Doyle, 426 U.S. at 613. During cross-examination of one of the defendants,
the line of questioning was as follows:
Q: ... And I assume you told him all about what happened to you?
A. No.
Q: ... Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you are
innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn't you tell
him?
Q: ... But in any event you didn't bother to tell Mr. Beamer anything
about this?
A No, sir.
Id. at 613-14.
7 Id. at 618. Prior to Doyle's holding that impeachment use of post-Miranda
[Vol. 63: 897
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soned that "silence in the wake of these warnings may be noth-
ing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights.
Thus, every postarrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because
of what the State is required to advise the person arrested."73
Dissenting in Doyle, Justice Stevens criticized the
majority's due process rationale as an estoppel analysis." By
informing a defendant of his right to remain silent, the govern-
ment is deemed estopped from using that silence against the
defendant later as evidence of his guilt." Embedded in the
Miranda warnings, Justice Stevens' estoppel theory asserts, is
an inducement to remain silent by way of an unstated promise
by the government that the defendant's silence will not be used
against him.
Justice Stevens' estoppel theory of Doyle was further rein-
forced-and limited-in Fletcher v. Weir." Police arrested
Weir and charged him with a homicide that occurred in a fight
outside a bar. After Weir was arrested but before police read
him the Miranda warnings, Weir remained silent." At trial,
Weir testified that he had killed in self-defense, and the prose-
cutor attempted to impeach him with his postarrest silence. 8
The Court ruled that this impeachment did not violate due
process because Weir had not yet been told his rights at the
time he remained silent. "In the absence of the sort of affirma-
tive assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings," impeach-
ment use of postarrest silence did not violate due process of
silence violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Miranda
Court declared that case-in-chief use of post-Miranda silence is prohibited under
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. hiranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 468 n.37. See infra text accompanying notes 281-82.
sDoyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
" Justice Stevens wrote:
[tihe Court's due process rationale has some of the characteristics of an
estoppel theory... The key to the Court's analysis is apparently a
concern that the Miranda warning, which is intended to increase the
probability that a person's response to police questioning will be intel-
ligent and voluntary, will actually he deceptive unless we require the
State to honor an unstated promise not to use the accused's silence
against hint
Id. at 620-21.
75 Id
76 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
7Id. at 604.
78 Id. at 603-04.
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On the heals of Doyle, Fletcher established that when a
previously silent defendant decides to take the stand at trial,
his due process rights are implicated only if the government
attempts to impeach him with the silence that occurred after
the reading of Miranda rights. As a matter of constitutional
law, therefore, use of a defendant's prearrest silence does not
violate his due process rights, because the government "induc-
es" a defendant to remain silent only when an officer actually
reads the Miranda warnings to the defendant.
However, more important for purposes of this Note is the
fact that Fletcher, like Doyle, failed to evaluate the Fifth
Amendment implications of using the postarrest, pre-trial
silence. Thus, in declaring on due process grounds that post-
Miranda silence is protected by virtue of the government's "im-
.plicit... assurance.., to any person who receives the warn-
ings.., that silence will carry no penalty,"" the Doyle Court
provided no guidance in analyzing whether a defendant's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination is also
impermissibly burdened by the admission into evidence of such
silence.
Doyle's due process analysis, on the other hand, presents a
useful analogy to Coercion Model II. Although the Miranda
warnings do not explicitly assure the arrestee that his silence
will carry no penalty,8' the Court deemed the impeachment
use of the defendant's silence "fundamentally unfair" because
such assurances are implicit.82 The Doyle defendant, though
not coerced or compelled to silence, was induced to remain
silent by governmental action. Prearrest silence, it will be
shown, may also be induced by governmental action under
Coercion Model ll. Where a defendant's prearrest silence
occurs during contact with law enforcement, it should be inad-
missible in the prosecution's case-in-chief on the grounds that
the individual had no responsive option other than to provide
7' Id. at 607.
8o Id. at 618.
1 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
82 Id.
' See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 for an introduction to Coercion
Model H; see infra text accompanying notes 229-78 for an explanation of Coerion
Model H as applied to prearrest questioning by police.
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testimonial incrimination."
C. Jenkins v. Anderson and Prearrest Silence
In Jenkins v. Anderson," the Court for the first time ap-
plied to the prearrest setting the constitutional test enunciated
in Griffin. The Jenkins defendant stabbed and killed Doyle
Redding on August 13, 1974, but was not apprehended until he
turned himself in to governmental authorities approximately
two weeks later."
At his trial for first-degree murder, the defendant testified
that he had killed in self-defense.' He claimed that his sister
and brother-in-law were robbed by Redding on August 12,
1974. Because the defendant was nearby when the robbery
occurred, he followed Redding a short distance and reported
his whereabouts to the police.' He testified that the next day
he encountered Redding, who accused him of reporting the
robbery to the police." The defendant stated that Redding
attacked him with a knife, and that after a brief struggle, he
was able to break away from Redding.'
On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that during
the struggle he had tried "to push that knife in [Redding] as
far as [I] could," but maintained that he had acted solely in
self-defense.9 The prosecutor questioned the defendant about
the fact that he waited two weeks to surrender to the police,
thereby attempting to impeach his credibility by suggesting
that he would have contacted the police immediately if he had
acted in self-defense.' The defendant was convicted of man-
"See infra text accompanying notes 229-78.
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
I& at 232.
' Id.87Ic
"Id at 232-33.
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 233.
9' Id. at 233.
Id. at 233. The line of questioning was as follows:
Q: And I suppose you waited for the Police to tell them what happened?
A. No, I didn't.
Q: You didn't?
A. No.
Q: I see. And how long was it after this day that you were arrested, or
that you were taken into custody?
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slaughter, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
question of the impeachment use of prearrest silence.
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated
by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal
defendant's credibility.93 The Court stated that it need not
reach the issue "whether or under what circumstances
prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment"
because "even if the prearrest silence were held to be an invo-
cation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent", im-
peachment use of the silence would be permitted.'
The Court then assumed without deciding that the
defendant's prearrest silence was indeed privileged under the
Fifth Amendment and validated the government's use of that
silence to impeach the defendant. 5 Applying the impermissi-
ble-burden balancing test, the Court reasoned that any burden
on the assumed constitutional right to remain silent before
arrest was outweighed by the important role of cross-examina-
tion in our legal system. "Impeachment follows the defendant's
own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the
truth-finding function of the criminal trial."96
The Jenkins Court declined to address whether, or to what
extent, prearrest silence is privileged under the Fifth Amend-
ment at all." Consequently, it is important to understand
that an analysis of the constitutionality of prosecutorial com-
ment on such silence must take into account two variations of
the impermissible-burden test. If prearrest silence is privi-
Id.
During closing argument, the prosecutor again referred to the defendant's
prearrest silence. The prosecutor noted that the defendant had "waited two weeks,
according to the testimony-at least two weeks before he did anything about sur-
rendering himself or reporting [the stabbing] to anybody." Id. at 234.
9 Id. at 238.
" Id. at 236 n.2. As discussed infra, the Jenkins Court relied on Raffel v.
United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), which permitted the impeachment use of oth-
erwise privileged silence. Prior to Jenkins, Raffel was thought by many (including
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall) to have been thoroughly discredited. Reli-
ance on Raffel enabled the Court to sidestep the issue whether the Jenkins
defendantes silence was actually an "invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent" entitling it to protection, since "Raffel clearly permits impeachment"
in any event. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
"' Id. at 238.
9Id.
9 Id. at 236 n.2.
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leged, then the focus of the impermissible-burden test is on
whether the constitutional right to remain silent before arrest
is impermissibly burdened by the later use of such silence as
evidence of guilt at trial (Impermissible-Burden Test ID.
On the other hand, if prearrest silence is not privileged
silence under the Fifth Amendment, then the impermissible-
burden test must focus on the choice to remain silent at trial
(Impermissible-Burden Test I). Under such circumstances,
the constitutional question is whether the constitutional right
not to testify at trial is impermissibly burdened when the State
comments on a defendant's non-privileged prearrest refusal to
speak to law enforcement agents.
The Jenkins holding and reasoning left a number of ques-
tions unanswered and as a result left lower courts with an
unclear roadmap for future prearrest issues. For example, how
does the reasoning of Jenkins affect the Fifth Amendment
rights of a defendant who chooses never to take the stand? Is a
defendant's prearrest silence categorically "privileged" under
the Fifth Amendment and merely waived when he decides to
take the stand and expose himself to the impeachment use of
his prearrest silence? Is prearrest silence sometimes privileged
and sometimes not?
The Jenkins Court commenced its rejection of the due
process claim by noting that "in this case, no governmental
action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest." "c
Indeed, the Jenkins defendant had no contact with law enforce-
ment during the two weeks between the stabbing and his ar-
' See infra notes 283-314 and accompanying text for the application of Imper-
missible-Burden Test H to prearrest choice of silence.
"In South Dakota v. Neuile, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983), the Court made clear
that impermissible-burden analysis will be applied only to a burdened constitution-
al right. See infra text accompanying notes 331-346 for the application of Imper-
missible-Burden Test I to the trial choice of silence.
- Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. The Jenkins Court held that a defendants right to
due process is not violated by the impeachment use of pre-arrest silence. The
Court reasoned that "the failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken
into custody and given Miranda warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfair-
ness present in Doyle is not present in this case." Id. Two years later, in Fletcher
v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), the Court added the final nail to the coffin of Doyle's
due process rationale by limiting due process analysis to the use of post-Miranda
silence. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. For this reason, this Note pro-
ceeds on the assumption that the government's use of prearrest silence does not
violate due process of law, either in its case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes.
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rest. His arrest came only after he surrendered to the police.
In the majority of cases confronting the issue of prearrest si-
lence since the Jenkins decision, however, the arrest has fol-
lowed attempted questioning by police investigators, during
which the defendant has remained silent.' Under such cir-
cumstances, Coercion Model H demonstrates that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is indeed implicated because in the
prearrest setting the individual has no responsive option other
than to provide incriminating testimonial evidence.0 2
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS FOLLOWING JENINS
Six months after the Jenkins ruling, Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit was confronted with the novel issue of the use
of prearrest silence in the prosecution's case-in-chief.0 3 Rec-
ognizing that the untested Supreme Court ruling in Jenkins
did not expressly permit the use of prearrest silence as part of
the Government's direct case, the Second Circuit chose to
await the "future impact of Jenkins" before ruling on the con-
stitutionality of the practice.' Recently, the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Thompson"5 exercised similar caution when
it declined to find prosecutorial comment on a defendant's
prearrest silence plain error because of the circuit split."6
Sandwiched between these cautious decisions, however,
are fifteen years of circuit rulings falling into two categories:
those which hold disingenously that Supreme Court precedent
... After Jenkins, the question of the constitutionality of prosecutorial comment
on prearrest silence has been addressed by the circuits most often when the si-
lence occurs during contact with law enforcement. See, e.g., United States v.
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (18t Cir.
1989); Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Davenport,
929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir.
1991). But see, e.g., United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996) (court
permits prosecutorial comment on prearrest silence which occurred both before and
after defendants contact with law enforcement).
1"2 See infra text accompanying notes 229-78 for an explanation of Coercion
Model H as applied to prearrest questioning by law enforcement.
1" United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1981).
'0' The Second Circuit assumed arguendo that evidentiary use of prearrest oi-
lence was constitutional error, but ruled that such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id at 876.
'0' 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996).
06 Id. at 856.
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clearly forbids such practice, and those which declare without
analysis that prearrest silence is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment. Of the five circuits which have decided this issue,
three conclude that evidentiary use of prearrest silence violates
the Fifth Amendment, while two circuits hold that such use is
constitutional. °7
A. Prearrest Silence Protected from Case-in-Chief
In Savory v. Lane,"8 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a ha-
beas petitioner's claim that the State prosecution's comment on
his refusal to talk to the police before he was arrested violated
his constitutional rights. 9 On the morning of January 18,
1977, two acquaintances of the defendant were murdered in
their home."0 A week after the murders, police asked to in-
terview the defendant. At trial, the state presented evidence
that in response to the police request, the defendant had said
that "he didn't want to talk about it, he didn't want to make
any statements.""'
Relying on Griffin, which held that the prosecutor may not
invite an inference of guilt from an accused's failure to take
the stand," the court found the reference to the defendant's
prearrest silence "to be of constitutional magnitude."113 Ulti-
mately, however, the court deemed the error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence
against him."4
The court commenced its constitutional analysis by rea-
107 The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits hold that evidentiary use of prearre3t
silence is unconstitutional, see infra text accompanying notes 108-46 for a
discussion of United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v.
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989); Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1987). The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits hold that evidentiary use of prearrest
silence is constitutional, see infra text accompanying notes 147-85 for a discussion
of United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590
(5th Cir. 1996).
3 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
1- Id. at 1017.
110 Id. at 1012.
SId. at 1015.
See infiatext accompanying notes 20-25.
1 Savory, 832 F.2d at 1018.
1 Id. at 1019.
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soning that "because appellant did not take the stand... the
problem involves the application of Griffin v. California""'
rather than "Jenkins v. Anderson .. . [which] is distinguish-
able... [because in Jenkins] the government used the
defendant's silence to impeach his trial testimony."1
1 6
The court provided little analysis as to why Jenkins was
not the controlling precedent, since it dealt with prearrest
silence, and Griffin distinguishable. Although the court con-
ceded that "Griffin involved governmental use of the
defendant's silence at trial" rather than before arrest, it con-
cluded that "we do not believe [this factor] make[s] a differ-
ence" because "[tihe right to remain silent... attaches before
the institution of formal adversary proceedings.""7 However,
as proof of this proposition, the court merely quoted the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution."8 In light of the fact that
the Supreme Court in Jenkins expressly declined to address
whether prearrest silence is privileged under the Fifth Amend-
ment," 9 the Savory court's conclusory statement, even if sup-
portable, is not a very useful analysis.
Worse still, this statement is both essentially meaningless
and potentially misleading. A person has a "right to remain
silent" at any time, before, during, or after arrest.' The im-
portant question, instead, is whether the Constitution protects
the person from an unfavorable inference that might be drawn
at trial from that silence-whenever the silence may have oc-
curred. The Unites States Supreme Court has crafted a Fifth
Amendment test to aid in answering this question: the imper-
missible-burden test. The Savory Court assumed that prearrest
silence is privileged and facilely applied the Griffin holding
while ignoring the test developed by Griffin and its progeny.
The Seventh Circuit thus failed to provide convincing ground-
work for an otherwise proper result.
115 Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
116 Id (citation omitted).
117 Id.
.1. Savory, 832 F.2d at 1017.
m Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
'o For example, prior to the Court's Miranda decision, every arrestee had a
"right to remain silent" during police interrogation. Not until the Court's decision,
however, was it established that there is a constitutionally guaranteed immunity
from incriminating inferences that might be drawn from that right. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37 (1966).
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Like the Seventh Circuit in Savory, the First and Tenth
Circuits rely on Griffin v. California to protect prearrest si-
lence but provide scarce justification for extending the Griffin
holding to the prearrest setting.'"' In United States v.
Burson,' the prosecution was permitted to introduce into
evidence the testimony of two Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
criminal investigators concerning defendant Burson's prearrest
silence.' The investigators testified that they arrived at
Burson's residence about two and one-half years prior to his
indictment and told him they would like to talk to him in con-
nection with an investigation of a business associate.' Spe-
cifically, the investigators told Burson that they wished to find
out the extent of his knowledge of the associate and whether
they had any financial dealings together.' Burson indicated
he was too busy, and an appointment was made for two days
later." When the investigators arrived at Burson's residence
on the appointed day, Burson was carrying a tape recorder and
"began interrogating the agents concerning their armament
and authority."' The agents then left because "it was appar-
ent that he would not cooperate.., or answer [their] ques-
tions."2
The Tenth Circuit ruled that admission into evidence of
the agents' testimony was plain constitutional error and de-
clared it immaterial that Burson was neither in custody during
the attempted questioning nor advised of his privilege against
self-incrimination.' Burson had effectively invoked the priv-
ilege because "Mr. Burson knew he was being interrogated as
part of a criminal investigation... [wihat is important is that
Mr. Burson clearly was not going to answer any of the agents'
I The First Circuit, for example, declared that the right against self-incrimina-
tion "is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a crime," Coppola v.
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir. 1989), and cited the Seventh Circuit's Savory
decision as primary authority. Id
1 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1200.
'Id.
SId.
Burson, 952 F.2d at 1200.
SId.
Id. at 1200-01.
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questions.""'0 Ultimately, the Court determined the error to
be harmless because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict even in the
absence of the impermissible evidence.'
In Coppola v. Powell,"3 2 the First Circuit ruled that a
defendant's prearrest statement to police that he would not
confess constituted an invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and was improperly admit-
ted into the prosecution's case-in-chief. 3 In addition, the
Court reversed the trial court's conviction because the errone-
ous admission of the statement could not be deemed harm-
less. 34
Coppola arose from the following facts. Shortly after mid-
night, a woman was raped by a man who had broken into her
home while she was sleeping.'35 After the man left, the wom-
an called the police.3 6 When the police arrived at the
woman's home, she gave them a detailed description of her
assailant. She also mentioned seeing a " 'little dark foreign car'
parked on the road across from her house."'37 An officer who
had seen a small burgundy compact car heading away from the
area at 12:52 a.m. identified the first three digits of the car's
license plate. This information led the police to defendant
Coppola, who was questioned by state and local officers shortly
after 2:30 a.m. that evening.3 '
Three days later, two state troopers returned to Coppola's
home.3 9 When asked "if he'd be willing to talk to us,"
Coppola replied: "Let me tell you something. I'm not one of
your country bumpkins. I grew up on the streets of Providence,
Rhode Island. And if you think I'm going to confess to you,
you're crazy."40 Six weeks later, Coppola was charged and
tried for rape. The trial judge allowed the trooper to testify as
M Id
131 Id. at 1201.
12 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1563.
m Id.
SId.
130 Io.
Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1563.
133 Id.
m Id.
140 Id
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to what Coppola had said, as well as to his "bragging tone of
voice."'
41
In affirming the trial court's conviction, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court interpreted Coppola's statement as fol-
lows:
A more significant flaw, however, infecting each of the defendant's
line of reasoning, is the factual unreality of equating his taunt to
the police with an invocation of his constitutional right to remain
silent. If he had couched his refusal in terms of speech versus si-
lence, it might be arguable that he was claiming a constitutional
warrant for his action. But his statement cannot be read as a mere
assertion that he, unlike a bumpkin, would not talk; he claimed,
rather, that the police were crazy to think that someone of his so-
phistication would confess. By describing his choice as a refusal to
confess, he implied that he had done something to confess about. It
was this implication that took the defendant's retort outside the
realm of allusions to the Fifth Amendment and affirmatively indicat-
ed his consciousness of guilt."
In reversing the conviction, the First Circuit forcefully
criticized the highest state court's characterization of Copolla's
statements as a "taunt to the police" and a "defiant re-
mark."' Even if the statements were a "defiant remark," the
Court observed that this fact would be irrelevant,'" because
the Supreme Court has long held that the invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination does not turn on a person's
choice of words, but rather the ' "entire context in which the
claimant spoke must be considered." ," Holding otherwise,
the First Circuit observed, would amount to "a rule of evidence
whereby an inference of consciousness of guilt will trump a
Fifth Amendment claim of the privilege."14
1.1 Id. at 1564.
1 Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 1566.
" Id.
14 Id. at 1565 (citing United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d at 902). The court
relied on the principle articulated by the United States Supreme Court, which
stated that ilt is agreed by all that a claim of the [Fifth Amendment) privilege
does not require any special combination of words. Quinn v. United State3, 349
U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
"' Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1566.
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B. Prearrest Silence Not Protected from the Case-in-Chief
The Constitution does not prohibit evidentiary use of
prearrest silence in the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits. In United
States v. Carter"7 the Eleventh Circuit relied on Jenkins and
ruled that the Government may comment on a defendant's
silence if it occurred prior to the time he was arrested and
given Miranda warnings. " 8
In Carter, the United States Customs officials in Miami
detected on radar a suspicious aircraft heading in the direction
of the United States from the Bahamas."' As it was getting
dark, the aircraft landed on a secluded, unlit airstrip. 5 ' By
the time federal agents arrived on the scene, the aircraft had
been locked up and abandoned.' 5' During the search of the
aircraft, the agents discovered traces of marijuana. In addition,
they discovered a passport in the name of Kevin Sheehy, a bot-
tle of insulin, and some syringes.'52
Defendant Sheehy chose not to testify at trial. However, a
Customs agent testified about a telephone coversation he had
with Sheehy several weeks after the aircraft was discov-
ered.'53 During the conversation, Sheehy said that he knew
the agent had his passport and insulin.' When the agent
asked Sheehy if he could explain why those items were in the
aircraft, Sheehy told him that he did not want to answer any
more questions without an attorney.1'55
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Sheehy's claim
that this testimony constituted an "impermissible statement
about his pre[-]arrest silence." 55 Citing Jenkins, the court de-
clared that "there is no question that in certain circumstances
it is permissible for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's
pre[-]arrest silence.""' However, the Court failed to mention
" 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).
14 Id. at 1577.
1 Id. at 1571-72.
0 Id. at 1572.
151 Id.
152 Carter, 760 F.2d at 1577.
153 Id.
154 Id.
"' Id.
' Id.
157 Carter, 760 F.2d at 1577.
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that the circumstances in Jenkins involved prosecutorial use of
prearrest silence for impeachment rather than as substantive
evidence of guilt. Because "Sheehy was not in custody at the
time the conversation took place... we hold that [the Customs
agent's] testimony in no way infringed upon Sheehy's constitu-
tional right to remain silent."'
Later, in United States v. Rivera,"9 the Eleventh Circuit
relied on Jenkins to rule that the Government may comment
on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to the time she was
arrested and given Miranda warnings." Defendants Vila
and Rivera arrived at Miami International Airport on a flight
from Barranquilla, Colombia. 6' Because the two were young,
spoke English without an accent, and were arriving from a
source country for cocaine, a Customs inspector approached
them after they had retrieved their luggage and asked to see
their passports, customs declarations, and airplane tickets."
At trial, the inspector testified about defendant Vila's
demeanor in the custom's line. He stated that when he initially
began to question her at the luggage carousel, she was "fairly
deadpan," expressionless, and without any visible signs of ner-
vousness about being questioned." The inspector then
opened one of the suitcases, noticed a false bottom, pierced it
with a screwdriver, and discovered cocaine." The inspector
testified that defendant Vila again "expressed no reaction or
protest' during this inspection." The prosecution later invit-
ed the jury to infer that Vila's "deadpan" expression was incon-
sistent with the reaction of a traveler with no knowledge that
her luggage contained contraband."
As a preliminary matter, the Eleventh Circuit expressed
uncertainty as to whether references to nonverbal conduct or
demeanor are even comments on silence. 1" The Court noted
that "there are difficult levels of gradation between types of
M Id&
... 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
1 I& at 1568.
I& Ic. at 1565.
1 2 Id
16 Id. at 1567.
16 Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1567,
16s I&
16 Id. at 1568.
1 7 Id- at 1568-69.
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human behavior that constitute a purely physical act and be-
havior that is soley a communication, " "1 and that comment
on a defendant's actions are not prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. 69 The court then held that even if construed as
comment on the defendant's silence, the inspector's testimony
did "not raise constitutional difficulties."7 °
Citing Jenkins, the court stated that "[t]he government
may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to
the time that he is arrested and given his Miranda warn-
ings." 7 ' However, the court made no mention of the fact that
the silence in Jenkins was used for impeachment rather than
as substantive evidence of guilt.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit put an end to any confusion
over the constitutional status of an individual's prearrest si-
lence when it stated that "the law of this circuit is settled that
evidence of pre-Miranda silence is admissible in the
government's case-in-chief as substantive proof of guilt."72
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Zanabria recently relied on Jenkins to conclude that
prearrest silence is not protected from the prosecution's case-
in-chief. In Zanabria, the defendant was arrested after
nearly three kilos of cocaine were found in his luggage during
an airport customs search. 7 1 His defense was that his actions
were the product of duress.' Although the defendant did not
testify at his trial, his wife testified that she and her husband
had been in a financial bind, which required that they borrow
money from an unidentified third party. When this party
began to make threats against their young daughter, the de-
fendant had engaged in the importation of cocaine to raise
funds to pay off the debt to the lender.7 1
10 Id. at 1569.
See infra text accompanying notes 224-28 for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence.
170 Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1567-68.
171 Id. at 1568.
8 United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1108 (1995).
1 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
174 Id. at 593.
175 Id. at 592.
176 Id.
17 Id.
176 Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 592.
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The arresting Customs officer testified that prior to the
defendant's arrest he said nothing about threats against his
daughter or that he needed any kind of help."' During clos-
ing argument, the prosecutor used this testimony to rebut the
duress defense by noting that the alleged threats had never
been reported to American or Columbian authorities.' Rely-
ing on dictum from the Supreme Court's Jenkins decision,"'
the Fifth Circuit held that admission of evidence of the
defendant's prearrest silence did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment because "the silence at issue was neither induced by nor
a response to any action by a government agent." "
In Zanabria, there was evidentiary use of two distinct
silent events. The first was the prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's silence that occurred before the defendant had any
contact with the authorities. The second was testimony regard-
ing the defendant's silence when confronted by the custom's
officer.' The Zanabria court, however, did not distinguish
between these two silent events or analyze them separately. To
the Fifth Circuit, then, prearrest silence is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of the context in
which the silence arises.
The above survey of the circuits' treatment of evidentiary
use of prearrest silence demonstrates the uncertainty sur-
rounding its constitutional status. Part M of this Note will
demonstrate that any analysis of the question of Fifth Amend-
ment protection of a defendant's prearrest silence must con-
sider the circumstances in which the silence occurs if the rea-
soning is to be consistent with basic tenets of Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Applying these tenets, it will conclude
that prearrest silence of the sort found in the prototype dis-
cussed in the Introduction,' where John Doe is confronted
179 Id at 593.
IS I.
*" The Zanabria court relied on Jenkins, where the Court stated that impeach-
ing a defendant with his pre-arrest silence was not fundamentally unfair and
violation of due process because "no governmental action induced petitioner to
remain silent before arrestf Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). The
Zanabria court, however, used this dicta to defeat a Fifth Amendment, rather
than a due process, claim. Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 693.
12 Id, 74 F.3d at 593.
Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593.
iM See supra, Introduction, for a description of the prototypical scenario.
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by police and indicates his unwillingness to speak or answer
questions, should be protected from the prosecution's case-in-
chief." Part IV will then argue that the prearrest silence of
the sort confronted by the Supreme Court in Jenkins, where
the defendant has no contact with law enforcement prior to
arrest, is not protected from comment during the prosecution's
case-in-chief. Such silence is not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment because the context in which it occurs lacks the
threshhold element of state action that the Constitution re-
quires.'8
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Rule of Jenkins is Limited to Impeachment Use of
Silence
In Jenkins v. Anderson,"s7 the United States Supreme
Court'ruled that impeachment use of prearrest silence does not
violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' To the extent that the Eleventh and Fifth
Circuits' holdings were the result of a mechanical application
of Jenkins to circumstances where the defendant chooses not to
testify, the Rivera89  and Zanabria"90  decisions were
wrongly decided.
To successfully argue that a precedent is distinguishable
and that reliance on it without additional analysis is errone-
ous, the point of distinction must be material. There are three
separate grounds-systemic, textual, and precedential-for
concluding that impeachment use of silence presents a materi-
ally different issue from evidentiary use of such silence and
that a reflexive extension of the Jenkins holding to a non-testi-
fying defendant is erroneous.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 222-314.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 315-46.
187 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
1 Id. at 238.
18 United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
"' United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
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1. Systemic
Federal and state evidentiary rules are replete with exam-
ples of the disparate standards of admissibility accorded evi-
dence used, on the one hand, to impeach a defendant's testimo-
ny, and evidence used to establish guilt in the prosecution's
case-in-chief on the other. Specifically, evidence that may be
inadmissible in the direct case on grounds of irrelevance or
undue prejudice may be admissible to impeach a testifying
defendant or as rebuttal evidence once a defendant chooses to
testify.
In its impeachment opinions, the Supreme Court has long
affirmed the constitutionality of this double-standard and has
justified its widespread use on "waiver" and "credibility-test-
ing" grounds. The Court has stated, for example, that if a de-
fendant waives the right to remain silent at trial, he "cannot
then claim the privilege against cross-examination on matters
reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examina-
tion." 1 This waiver theory permits states to develop their
own evidentiary rules defining the extent to which otherwise
excluded evidence may be permitted to rebut a defendant's
testimony.' 2
Likewise, the Court has allowed impeachment of the de-
fendant with illegally seized evidence if the defendant "opens
the door" during direct, and, in some instances, even cross-
examination. On the understanding that once a defendant
testifies, his credibility is indisputably in issue,' the Court
has allowed this otherwise inadmissible evidence to test the
defendant's credibility.' In stark contrast, however, the
"I Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215
(1971) (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896)).
1 The Court has on rare occasions exercised its supervisory powers to reverse
a trial court's determination of the proper scope of cross-examination. In Agnzdlo u.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, (1925), for example, the prosecutor had impeached the
defendant with evidence that was excluded from the government's direct case be-
cause it had been seized in violation of the defendants Fourth Amendment rights.
In finding the impeachment use unconstitutional, the Court rejected the state's
argument that the defendant had waived protection against use of the evidence.
The Court observed that the impeachable testimony was elicited only in the course
of cross-examination, and nothing the defendant testified to during direct examina-
tion could be taken as justifying cross-examination about the illegally seized evi-
dence. Id. at 35.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2276, at 463-69.
In a series of controversial decisions which effectively overruled Agndlo,
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Court has committed itself to the position that evidence illegal-
ly obtained by law enforcement is nearly always inadmissible
in the prosecution's case-in-chief.'95 Because of the pervasive
doctrinal distinction between admissibility for impeachment
and admissibility for substantive evidence of guilt, the Elev-
enth and Fifth Circuits' unreasoned application of the Jenkins
rule was unjustified.
2. Textual
The language of the Jenkins decision-the decision on
which the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits rely-expressly refers to
the special circumstance of impeachment evidence. The Court
began its analysis by observing:
The Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain
silent during his criminal trial and prevents the prosecution from
commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right. In
this case, of course, the petitioner did not remain silent throughout
the criminal proceedings. Instead, he voluntarily took the witness
stand in his own defense.1"
The Court closed its discussion of the Fifth Amendment
claim with this brief paragraph, which includes the case hold-
ing:
Thus impeachment follows the defendant's own decision to cast
aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of
the criminal trial. We conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not
violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal
defendant's credibilty. 9
Similarly, the Court concluded its consideration of the due
supra note 192, the Court opened the scope of cross-examination to allow the
prosecution to bring in evidence not clearly associated with the subject of direct
examination. In United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), for example, the
Court permitted illegally seized evidence to be used to impeach statements elicited
from the defendant only on cross-examination. Id. at 628. Similarly, in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), statements obtained in violation of Miranda were
admissible impeachment evidence once the defendant gave inconsistent testimony.
Id. at 225.
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see generally Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970).
1" Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 237 (1980) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
19 Id. (emphasis added).
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process claim with the following words:
In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain
silent before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the peti-
tioner was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings. Conse-
quently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not present
in this case. We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Because the language of the holding expressly confines Jenkins
to impeachment use of prearrest silence, the same case can
hardly be said to stand for the proposition that evidentiary use
of such silence is permissible.
3. Precedential
There exists important Supreme Court precedent to guide
the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit to the conclusion that a Fifth
Amendment rule for impeachment use of evidence may not be
the rule for use in the Government's case-in-chief. More impor-
tantly, such precedent is cited by the Jenkins Court as justifi-
cation for allowing impeachment by prearrest silence.
The Jenkins Court referred to its decision in Harris v. New
York,' where the Court held that a statement taken in vio-
lation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant's credi-
bility."co Such an illegally obtained statement, however,
would have been deemed presumptively compelled under
Miranda and therefore inadmissible in the case-in-chief."
The Jenkins Court quoted the Harris Court's reasoning-
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obliga-
tion to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did
no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary process.
Most significant, however, was the Jenkins Court's express
reliance on the case of Raffel v. United States, 3 where for
the first time the Court evaluated the use of prior silence as an
Id at 240 (emphasis added).
401 U.S. 222 (1971), discussed in text, supra, accompanying notes 56-60.
20 Id. at 225.
201 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (1971)).
271 U.S. 494 (1926).
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
impeachment device. Defendant Raffel failed to testify at his
first trial."4 After a hung jury, the defendant was faced with
the same charges in a second criminal trial.2 5 The defendant
took the stand in his own defense in the second trial, and the
trial court permitted the prosecution to cross-examine the
defendant about his failure to take the stand during the first
trial.0 ' The Supreme Court in Raffel assumed that Raffel's
silence at his first trial was not admissible in the government's
case-in-chief during the second trial, but held that the defen-
dant had waived protection against its use because he testified
at the second trial.07 The Court concluded that "the safe-
guards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those
who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf, and
not for those who do." 8
The silence at issue in Raffel was characterized by the
Jenkins Court as "prior silence," and "inquiry into prior silence
was proper" because when defendant Raffel chose to testify,
the privileged status of the silence was waived.20 The
Jenkins Court's reliance on Raffel's waiver analysis was ex-
press and unconditional. Indeed, the Court declared that it
need not consider "whether or under what circumstances
prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment.., because the rule of Raffel clearly permits impeach-
ment even if the prearrest silence were held to be an invoca-
tion of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent."
210
Despite the Jenkins Court's express refusal to address this
question, 211 the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits construed
Jenkins to mean that prearrest silence is not protected by the
Fifth Amendment. While the Supreme Court has not yet
passed on the holding that these circuits reached, it is clear
that reliance on Jenkins was erroneous.
204 Id. at 495.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 497.
2 Raffel, 271 U.S. at 499.
21 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236.
210 Id. at 236 n. 2.
211 Id.
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B. The Fifth Amendment Prohibits Evidentiary Use of
Prearrest Silence
Of course, demonstrating that the Jenkins rule is inappo-
site when a defendant chooses not to testify does not demon-
strate that the Fifth Amendment in fact forbids using prear-
rest silence in the case-in-chief. Under Griffin and its progeny,
the protection of silence depends on whether state action
impermissibly burdens the constitutional right not "to be a
witness against [onelself."2'2
However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated
that there is a constitutional right to remain silent before
arrest.21 Because the waiver analysis of Raffel v. United
States" permitted impeachment use of prearrest silence in
any event, the Jenkins Court expressly declined to address
"whether or to what extent prearrest silence may be protected
by the Fifth Amendment." 5 Determination of this question,
however, is a critical threshhold matter. If choosing to remain
silent before arrest is found to be an exercise of a constitution-
al privilege, then prohibiting an inference of guilt from such
exercise follows logically from Griffin v. California,216 as the
First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have concluded. This logical
extension will be demonstrated through the application of
Griffin's impermissible-burden analysis to the prearrest choice
of silence.2
On the other hand, if choosing to remain silent before
arrest is found not to be an exercise of a constitutional privi-
lege,21 1 then the fact of prearrest silence is to be treated like
212 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96. The closest the Court has come to
enunciating such a prearrest right is its holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 Us.
436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court stated that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is jeopardized 'when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning" I&. at 478. The Court further defined the notion of deprived freedom
as "all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed." Id. at 467. In a pre-
arrest, non-custodial interrogation, of course, the questionee is free to leave.
=" 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236, n.2.
216 For a review of Griffin and impermissible-burden analysis, see supra notes
20-27.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 283-314 for a discussion of impermissible-
burden analysis as applied to privileged pre-arrest silence.
21' Justice Stevens has argued this perspective. In his Jenkins concurrence, he
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any other piece of evidence.219 Evidence of prearrest silence
would be constitutionally.. protected from the prosecution's
case-in-chief only if such evidence were found to impermissibly
burden the constitutional right not to take the stand at trial.
Meeting this requirement, as will be demonstrated in Part IV,
would be much more difficult and in any event not likely to be
codified into a constitutional rule.22 '
1. The Privilege Attaches to Prearrest Silence
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will apply gener-
al Fifth Amendment principles in order to determine whether
a given statement is within the reach of the privilege against
self-incrimination." To be within the scope of the privilege,
two elements must be present: testimonial evidence and com-
pulsion.2"
a. Testimonial Evidence
The Court draws a distinction between "testimonial" and
"real or physical evidence" for purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and has determined that the privilege is a
bar only to compelling "communications" or "testimony."2 24
explained that he would not have relied on Raffle's waiver analysis to justify per-
mitting impeachment with pre-arrest silence, because such reliance incorrectly
implies that Fifth Amendment principles are applicable to a pre-custody context.
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241. In Stevens's view, "[wihen a citizen is under no official
compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain silent, I see no reason why his
voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any issue under the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 243-44.
219 The Court has made clear that Griffin's impermissible-burden test is applied
only to burdened constitutional rights. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983) ("The specific rule of Griffin is thus inapplicable" because "unlike the
defendant's situation in Griffin, a person suspected of drunk driving has no consti-
tutional right to refuse to take a blood test").
22 Of course, in the event the Constitution does not protect pre-arrest silence
from the prosecution's case-in-chief, such silence might still be subject to an
exclusionary rule under applicable evidentiary law.
222 See infra, Part IV, text accompanying notes 33146 for the application of
Impermissible-Burden Test I to the trial choice of silence.
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983).
Id. at 561-62; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590 (1990).
224 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591. Under this dichotomy, a suspect can be compelled
to participate in a lineup and to repeat phrases provided by the police, because it
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The critical test of the testimonial character of evidence is
whether the communication elicited will be relied on by the
state "as involving [the accused's] consciousness of the facts
and the operations of his mind in expressing it. Further-
more, this definition "applies to both verbal and nonverbal
conduct; nonverbal conduct contains a testimonial component
whenever the conduct reflects the actor's communication of his
thoughts to another.'
In fact, treating a defendant's prior silence as testimony
has a long pedigree in the doctrine of "assenting silence." The
doctrine holds that an individual's silence in the face of accusa-
tions of crime made in his hearing, provided he had the oppor-
tunity to respond, may be used as a tacit admission of the
truth of the facts contained in the statement.'
Silence in the face of police questioning, then, like a nod or
head shake,' clearly meets the threshhold requirement that
the act be testimonial in character. If found to be elicited
through compulsion, the silence is privileged under the Fifth
Amendment.
b. Coercion Model f
The Court has long held that "the Fifth Amendment is
limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion'
exerted on the person asserting the privilege.' This coer-
cion requirement comes directly from the language of the privi-
lege, which commands that no person "shall be compelled in
is deemed "compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have." United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 222 (1967). Similarly, the state may force a person suspected of drunk
driving to submit to a drug test. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594-95 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201
(1988) (quoting 8 WIGINORE § 2265 at 386)).
' MunLz, 496 U.S. at 595 n. 9; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n. 5 ("[a] nod or
head-shake is as much a 'testimonial' or 'communicative' act in this sense as are
spoken words").
22 See E. CLEARY, McCoRMxciKs HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185.
See also 3A J. WIGMOREsupra note 3, § 1042, at 1056 (failure to state a fact
when it would have been natural to assert it constitutes an assertion of the non-
existence of the fact).
See supra note 226.
"' South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (citation omitted).
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any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 0 Of
course, a literal reading of the privilege refers to a situation in
which the government actually seeks to force a defendant to
testify at his criminal trial."' However, rather than requiring
a showing of actual compulsion to incriminate oneself, the
Court instead prohibits the state from unduly penalizing "priv-
ileged silence. "2a2
Privileged silence, in turn, is silence that arises in circum-
stances where there are "inherently compelling pressures" to
speak and incriminate oneself. 3 Applying this less-than lit-
eral reading of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has extended
the privilege to various settings, such as grand jury proceed-
ings,' civil proceedings," congressional investigations,"6
juvenile proceedings, 7 subpoenaed witnesses,"8  and custo-
dial silence." 9
The prearrest silence in the prototype scenario given in
the Introduction of this Note is privileged because any re-
sponse to police questioning amounts to compulsion under
Coercion Model II. 4° The situation entails the requisite "in-
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2" It has been argued that since the Supreme Court has never held that pros-
ecutorial uses of silence amount to "compulsion," direct comment upon silence
should be allowed, even where, as in Griffin, the silence is an exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference
of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV.
841 (1980).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 20-27, and infra text accompanying notes
281-82, for examples of Court prohibiting prosecutorial comment on silence without
characterizing prosecutorial action as compulsion.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). In Miranda, the Court ruled
that the privilege against self-incrimination extended into custodial interrogations
and that such interrogations needed additional procedural safeguards because
"without [them] the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to under-
mine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely." Id.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
z' McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
2n In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
z' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 47-50 for a review of Coercion Model II.
This view of coercion was first articulated by Justice Murphy's dissent in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) and applied to the choice to remain silent at
trial. See supra notes 41-43.
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herently compelling pressures "1 because the state has put
the individual in a position in which, regardless of his re-
sponse, he is compelled to provide the state with incriminating
testimonial evidence. Specifically, John Doe's prearrest speech
is testimonial. Further, there is no constitutional bar prohibit-
ing the substantive use of his speech against him at trial.'
His prearrest silence is also testimonial.' If the silence is
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, then during
prearrest questioning the state has compelled Doe to provide
incriminating testimonial evidence.'
This state-imposed "catch-22" is comparable to the pur-
ported "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt" 5 which the Court has cited when justifying the appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment privilege to custodial interroga-
tions. The case of Miranda v. Arizona s and its later expla-
nation by the Court is instructive in demonstrating this point.
Miranda requires police officers to adopt certain proce-
dures before conducting a custodial interrogation."7 Specifi-
cally, officers must tell the arrestee that she has the right to
remain silent, that she has a right to an attorney, and that
24 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
24 This proposition is so fundamental to the function of law enforcement as to
be axiomatic. The Miranda Court emphasized that [ajny statement given freely
and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evi-
dence .... Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today" Miranda,
384 U.S. at 478. While a defendant's statements made prior to custody may be
excluded under evidentiary law as hearsay, most states maintain either codified or
judicially constructed exceptions to the hearsay rule which permit the admission of
incriminating pre-arrest statements as long as there exists trustworthy grounds for
presuming that the statements were in fact made.
2,3 See supra text accompany notes 224-28.
2" See Poulin, supra note 12, at 218-19. Justice MAlurphy first articulated this
coercion model when, in dissent, he argued that comment on the refusal to testify
at trial violated the Fifth Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 42.
When the Court finally adopted Murphy's position in Griffin, it made no reference
to Murphy's coercion model.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
' Id. at 479. The Miranda warnings need not be read to a suspect during the
type of non-custodial interrogation at issue in this Note. The majority of Courts
have concluded that police questioning 'on the street,' in a public place or in a
person's office or home is not custodial" Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel,
CRMINAL PROCEDURE §6.6(e),(f) (2d ed. 1992).
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anything she says may be used against her later."S Before
promulgating these procedural rules, the Miranda Court first
addressed "whether the privilege is fully applicable during a
period of custodial interrogation." 49 The Court wanted it un-
derstood that the newly required Miranda warnings did not
broaden the scope of the Fifth Amendment, but rather guaran-
teed its enforcement." ° Finding recourse in the "complex of
values" underlying the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the Miranda Court declared that "we are satisfied that the
principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compul-
sion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody
questioning. "12
Later, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,"s the Court declared
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is primarily designed to
prevent the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt" found in an inquisitorial system of criminal justice.'
Further, the Court acknowledged that custodial interrogations
present different choices from the historic cruel trilemma, but
"despite these differences," the Miranda Court had properly
found the privilege applicable because the custodial setting
"raises similar concerns." 5 The Court specified the differenc-
es:
During custodial interrogation, the pressure on the suspect to re-
spond flows not from the threat of contempt sanctions, but rather
from the "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely." Moreover, false testimony does
not give rise directly to sanctions (either religious sanctions for lying
under oath or prosecutions for perjury), but only indirectly (false
testimony might itself prove incriminating, either because it links
24U Id.
249 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (1966).
"' This point was underscored later in Roberts u. United States, 445 U.S. 552,
560 (1980), where the Court stated that "the right to silence described in those
[Miranda] warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it."
2' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5 (1964) and its enumeration of the various policies
behind privilege). See supra text accompanying note 19 for Murphy's list of these
policies.
252 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
- 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
2' Id. at 595.
2" Id. at 596-97.
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(albeit falsely) the suspect to the crime or because the prosecution
might later prove at trial that the suspect lied to the police, giving
rise to an inference of guilty conscience)."
Thus the Muniz Court found that the custodial interrogee
faces three choices, each of which is so unattractive that the
choice amounts to a cruel trilemma. He can respond honestly
to the questions, but that would be self-incrimination. He can
lie, but this may expose him to an inference of a guilty con-
science. Finally, he can remain silent. Even though there is no
modern contempt sanction for remaining silent, prong three is
not a way out of the "trilemma," because, according to the
Miranda Court, a person might be unable to resist the pres-
sure to speak. As analyzed by the Court, of course, this final
prong-the choice of silence-presents no negative consequenc-
es, and thus there is no trilemma (or even dilemma).' 7 Rath-
er, the Miranda Court believed that, due to pressure by law
enforcement, the choice of remaining silent might not be exer-
cised unless the arrestee is affirmatively and clearly told he
has the right to do so by way of the Miranda warnings.
In contrast, the non-custodial questionee faces an actual
dilemma. Like the custodial interrogee, the prearrest interro-
gee can choose to speak and incriminate himself. Also like the
custodial interrogee, he can choose to remain silent without
facing the contempt sanctions originally contemplated by the
privilege. 8 Unlike the custodial interrogee, the prearrest
questionee faces a true dilemma"9 because negative conse-
quences attach regardless of whether he chooses to speak or to
remain silent; the negative consequence is involuntarily to
provide incriminating testimonial evidence.
The effect of not applying Coercion Model H to prearrest
silence is to put a person whom the government does not have
probable cause to arrest in a far more compulsive situation
Id. at 597 (1990).
As analyzed under Coercion Mlodel II, however, the custodial interrogee faces
the same trilemma as a prearrest questionee: if he chooses to remain silent, he is
forced to incriminate himself by providing testimonial silence. The Miranda Court
resolved this trilemma by holding that the Court may not use the privileged si-
lence at trial. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
496 U.S. at 597.
' To the extent that the Court has charitably replaced the original 'pejury"
prong with a modernized "inference of guilty conscience" prong, the prearrest
questionee also faces a "trilemma".
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than he would face under "official compulsion." Under the
Supreme Court's protective holdings in Miranda v. Arizona
and Doyle v. Ohio, a custodial interrogee is never forced into
the Coercion Model's "catch-22" whereby he must provide in-
criminating testimonial evidence, because these cases prohibit
the state from using post-Miranda silence against the individu-
al at trial.16' A prearrest questionee, on the other hand, ab-
sent Coercion Model-based protection from inculpatory infer-
ences at trial, is inescapably "compelled to be a witness against
[him]self when he decides not to answer police questions be-
fore arrest.
Application to the prearrest setting of Coercion Model I's
"double bind" definition of compulsion represents a departure
from the "inherently compelling pressures" analysis employed
by the Miranda Court. Indeed, if prearrest silence were ana-
lyzed only under the Miranda approach, the requisite level of
compulsion would not likely be categorically present in all
prearrest questioning. Instead, under an "inherently compel-
ling pressures" analysis, any given application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to the prearrest setting would likely
entail a difficult case-by-case inquiry.
Indeed, it was on these grounds that the Miranda Court
exempted non-custodial questioning from its conclusion that
the Fifth Amendment attached to the "informal compulsion" of
custodial interrogations.6 1 The Court noted that "the compel-
ling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody inter-
rogation is not necessarily present" in the non-custodial con-
text.
262
Nevertheless, replacing Miranda's "inherently compelling
pressures" approach in the prearrest setting with the analysis
exemplified by Coercion Model II has a number of virtues.
First, application of Coercion Model II has the virtue of pre-
26 See supra text accompanying notes 61-73 for a discussion of the protection
from impeachment use of silence under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); see
infra text accompanying notes 281-82 for a discussion of the protection from evi-
dentiary use of silence under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
261 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
26 Id. at 477-78. Under Miranda's "inherently compelling pressures" test, for
instance, the Court has concluded that the privilege does not attach to court-im-
posed probation interviews because such a setting, unlike a custodial one, does not
"convey to the [individual] a message that he has no choice but to submit to the
officer's will and to confess." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 420 (1984).
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venting a true dilemma and thus, unlike the "inherently com-
pelling pressures" analysis, serves a purpose originally contem-
plated by the privilege.' Second, Coercion Model II is fim-
ly grounded in the Supreme Coures contemporary Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. The case of South Dakota v.
Neville' illustrates this point.
In Neville, the Court observed that Fifth Amendment con-
cerns may arise when the government provides an individual
no responsive option other than to provide testimonial incrimi-
nation. The Neville Court considered the constitutionality of a
state statute that permitted the admission into evidence of a
suspect's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test.' The
Court stated that Griffin's impermissible-burden test did not
apply because there is "no constitutional right to refuse to take
a blood-alcohol test.' Instead, "general Fifth Amendment
principles" controlled the inquiry, requiring the presence of
testimonial evidence and coercion.' Finally, the Court as-
sumed that refusal to submit to the test was testimonial, and
rested its decision soley on coercion analysis.'
The Neville Court ruled that there was no unconstitutional
coercion."' It began its analysis by noting that seventeen
years earlier, in Schmerber v. California,"0 the Court had up-
held the constitutionality of compelling a drunk driving sus-
pect to submit to a blood-alcohol test on the grounds that such
a test was non-testimonial evidence." The statute at issue in
Neville, the Court observed, gave the suspect a choice either to
submit and incriminate himself with non-testimonial evidence,
or to refuse and to have his testimonial refusal admitted
against himY2 The Court reasoned that there is no coercion
when the state could have' constitutionally compelled him to
2" Muniz, 496 U.S. at 596.
2'4 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
2 Id at 564.
218 I& at 560 n.lO.
Id at 560.
26 I& at 563. The Court chose not to ground its decision in the lack of testimo-
nial evidence because "the distinction between real evidence ... and communica-
tions or testimony... is not readily drawn in many cases." Id.
263 459 U.S at 564.
270 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
r" 459 U.S. at 560.
2Id.
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take the test and thereby provide non-testimonial evidence. 3
This was not "a case where the State has subtly coerced re-
spondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel,
rather than offering a true choice."274
The Neville Court made clear that the suspect could have
taken the test without providing testimonial evidence or sacri-
ficing any constitutional right. Importantly, however, the deci-
sion suggests that if the state provides an individual only with
an option "that it had no right to compel"-namely, to provide
testimonial statements or silence-Fifth Amendment concerns
are raised.275
The Court has not adopted Coercion Model II to prohibit
the evidentiary use of silence, but rather has applied imper-
missible-burden or due process analyses to prohibit govern-
mental use of "privileged" silence. It is important to reiter-
ate, therefore, that Coercion Model II has been employed here
not to establish conclusively that prosecutorial comment on
prearrest silence is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Rath-
er, the model is used to answer the threshhold question ex-
pressly left open in Jenkins-whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege is even applicable "when a citizen is under no official
compulsion whatever."277
27 Id. at 564.
27 Id. at 563-64.
"' Professor Barbara Snyder takes a different view of Neville. She states that
"[b]ecause the Court concluded that requiring the defendant in Neville to make
such a choice did not constitute compulsion, forcing a defendant to choose betveen
incriminating himself by speaking or incriminating himself by remaining silent
likewise is not compulsion." Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the
Impeachment Use of Silence in Criminal Trials, 29 WMI. & MARY L. REV. 285, 315-
16 (1988). Professor Snyder seems to ignore the express reasoning in Neville: that
the option of submitting to the test could be constitutionally compelled. This is
more than dicta, as is evidenced by the Court's later interpretation of the Neville
reasoning: [in South Dakota v. Neville, we held that since submission to a blood
test could itself be compelled, a State's decision to permit a suspect to refuse to
take the test but then to comment upon that refusal at trial did not "compel" the
suspect to incriminate himself and hence did not violate the privilege." Pennsylva-
nia v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604 n.19 (citations omitted) (1990). In contrast, be-
cause the police can neither constitutionally compel a prearrest questionee to
speak nor to remain silent, drawing a negative inference from either amounts to
compulsion under Coercion Model II.
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 247-52; see infra text accompanying notes
281-83.
"' Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-45 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The Court has explained that there must be a "testimoni-
al" and "compulsion" component to trigger the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 8 Because a prearrest questionee's si-
lence is testimonial and because his silence is coerced under
Coercion Model H, both components are present in the context
of prearrest questioning by law enforcement. Under Griffin
and Jenkins, the question then is whether this privileged
prearrest silence is impermissibly burdened when the prosecu-
tion is permitted to comment on it at trial.
2. Privileged Prearrest Silence is Impermissibly Burdened
by Prosecutorial Comment at Trial
The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits concluded without
analysis that prearrest silence is privilegedY9 The Courts
then concluded without analysis that case-in-chief use of such
silence is prohibited under the rule of Griffin v. California.
Even without additional analysis, this second conclusion was
justified, because following Griffin, the Supreme Court has
never permitted prosecutorial comment on privileged silence.
There is strong indication that the Court itself regards
Griffin to support the broad rule that the Fifth Amendment
forbids direct comment on privileged silence, rather than the
narrower rule that the Fifth Amendment forbids direct com-
ment on the right not to take the witness stand. For example,
after finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination attaches to the custodial setting, the Miranda
Court forthwith ruled that the prosecution may not use this
privileged silence as substantive evidence of guilt at trial."'
In a footnote, the Court remarked:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is
under police interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use
at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the
face of accusation.2'
27 Neville, 459 U.S. at 560.
' See supra text accompanying notes 110-51 for a review of these Circuit deci-
sions.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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The Miranda Court did not apply Griffin's impermissible-
burden analysis to explain exactly why prosecutorial comment
on newly privileged custodial silence is an unconstitutional
burden on the exercise of the privilege. The Miranda Court
merely cited Griffin for this proposition. Therefore, it may be
reasonably interpreted from the Court's own use of Griffin that
an unconstitutional burden is presumed when the state's bur-
densome action is conceptually identical to the burden prohib-
ited by Griffin-namely, direct comment on the individual's
exercise of privileged silence. Because of the Miranda Court's
use of the Griffin holding, the First, Seventh, and Tenth Cir-
cuits were justified in concluding that direct comment on privi-
leged prearrest silence is an impermissible burden on a consti-
tutional right.
a. Application of Impermissible-Burden Test to Privileged
Prearrest Silence
While neither the Miranda Court nor the circuits actually
applied the impermissible-burden balancing test to silence that
had been deemed "privileged," application of the burden analy-
sis indeed demonstrates that the substantive use of privileged
prearrest silence does impermissibly burden the constitutional
right not be a witness against oneself. The case of Jenkins v.
Anderson' is a useful starting point for this discussion.
The Jenkins Court applied impermissible-burden analysis
to the prosecutorial use of prearrest silence arguendo.'8 The
Court concluded that even if prearrest silence were construed
as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, impeach-
ment use of the silence did not represent an impermissible
burden on the assumed constitutional right. 85 The Court not-
ed that the test required the balancing of two considerations:
(1) the nature and extent of the burden; and (2) the "legitimacy
of the challenged governmental practice." "
The Jenkins Court did not analyze the nature and extent
of the burden on the assumed constitutional right (prong one),
283 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
2 Id. at 238.
2S5 Id.
288 Id.
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but instead laconically reasoned that comment on prearrest si-
lence was permissible because of the legitimate truth-testing
function of cross-examination (prong two).' Because the
Court did not inquire into prong one-the burden-the Court
provided no guidance as to what policies behind the privilege
might be compromised by substantive use of privileged silence
in the case-in-chief. Therefore, unclear is this: absent the ap-
parently dispostive importance of the state's truth-testing in-
terest during cross-examination, what might be a countervail-
ing legitimate government interest in burdening the prearrest
exercise of the privilege?
i. Legitimacy of Substantive Use of Prearrest Silence
The government cleary has an interest in presenting evi-
dence from which a jury may conclude the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. This interest is legitimate when
the inculpatory evidence is admissible under the applicable
evidentiary rules and does not violate a constitutional man-
date.' Assuming that use of privileged prearrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt is legitimate under the applicable
evidentiary law, the fact remains that the constitutional legiti-
macy of such trial practice is an open question. Indeed, absent
a bright-line rule such as the judicially recognized state inter-
est in impeaching a defendant's credibility through cross-exam-
ination,' the question of the constitutional legitimacy of the
case-in-chief use of privileged prearrest silence is a circular
one. One cannot adequately "balance" the burden on a consti-
tutional right against the "legitimacy of the governmental
practice" if the legitimacy of the practice depends on whether
the action in question--comment on the prearrest exercise of
the privilege-violates the constitution.
The Jenkins Court succinctly reasoned that 'once a defendant decides to tea-
tify, [tihe interests of the other party [the state] and regard for the function of
courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance
of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination! " Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United State3, 356
U.S. 148, 156 (1958)). This is so because "such impeachment on cros3-examina-
tion... advances the truth-finding function of the criminal triaL" Jenkins, 447
U.S. at 238.
29 AAL JUlR 2D Evidence § 251 (1967).
' Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
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This conundrum perhaps explains why the rule of Griffin
v. California" was not originally articulated as a balancing
test. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas instead articu-
lated a bright-line rule that the prosecution must not comment
on a defendant's exercise of the privilege at trial.29' In reach-
ing its decision, the Court focused on the burden such com-
ment imposes on the choice not to testify.92 As to the chal-
lenged governmental practice, the Court crisply concluded it
was illegitimate: "It is a penalty imposed by Courts for exercis-
ing a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by
making its assertion costly."93
If the Griffin Court had applied the balancing test later
articulated in Jenkins v. Anderson,2 rather than establish-
ing the base rule that guilt may not be constitutionally in-
ferred from the exercise of the privilege, the Court would have
faced the same insoluble circularity: (1) evidentiary use of the
refusal to testify represents some burden on the privilege, and
(2) the Government's interest in using this evidence is illegiti-
mate because such state action violates the Fifth Amendment.
ii. Burden on the Prearrest Exercise of the Privilege
Analysis must now turn to prong one, the more demon-
strable prong of the balancing test: "whether a constitutional
right has been burdened impermissibly." 5 Under this prong,
the question is whether state action "impairs to an appreciable
290 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
291 Id. at 615.
292 The Griffin Court noted that not every man, "however honest," would will-
ingly take the witness stand because of "excessive timidity, nervousness when
facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and
offenses charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a
degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him." Griffin, 380 U.S.
at 613 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)). The privilege
against self-incrimination, therefore,
in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned
might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have
been in somee degree compromised by their association with others, de-
clares that the failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to
be a witness shall not create any presumption against him.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613 (quoting Wilson, 149 U.S. at 66).
29 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
29 447 U.S. at 238 (1980).
2" Jenkins, 477 U.S. at 238.
[Vol. 63: 897
19971 NON-TESTIFYING DEFEIVDAN'S PREARREST SILENCE 943
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."' The
policies motivating the constitutionally stated right not to "be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
[one]self 7 are multiple, and were stated at length in Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Commission."3
In revisiting the policies underlying the privilege since the
Murphy decision, the Court has stated that of foremost impor-
tance is prohibiting the historic "cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury, or contempt" or its modern counterpart, the di-
lemma of self-accusation or "false statements... giving rise to
an inference of guilty conscience.'3
When the state uses the fact of privileged prearrest silence
against the defendant, the trilemma posed by Coercion Model
H is imposed on the prearrest choice: self-accusation by affir-
mative statement, self-accusation by silence, or an inference of
guilty conscience by false statements. Indeed, this trilemma is
arguably more burdensome than the one originally envisioned
when contempt sanctions for silence existed. The prearrest
questionee, after all, does not have the option to choose con-
tempt sanctions over becoming a witness against himself. The
state gives him no choice in the prearrest setting- he must be a
witness against himself. Similarly, the prearrest questionee's
trilemma is more burdensome than the choice facing the custo-
dial questionee, because, under Miranda, the custodial
questionee can exercise silence without any negative inference
at trial.3
0
The Court has stated that the privilege against self-in-
crimination reflects "our fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses."'
However, if a state's proffered evidence is silence rather than
an affirmative statement, the protection against involuntary
and compelled statements is hollow.
As Professor Ann Poulin points out, "a defendant makes
an affirmative statement at a specific point in time, and a
court can evaluate the circumstances under which the state-
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
378 U.S. 52 (1964). See infra text accompanying note 20.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596-97 (1990).
'"Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
301 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
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ment was given.""2 However, prearrest silence may arise
over a protracted period of contact with law enforcement."°3
Because silence shows resistance to attempts to undermine an
individual's will, silence can be too easily dismissed as a volun-
tary act rather than as compelled. Indeed, "it seems impossible
to assess whether silence is voluntary."' °4 Since the determi-
nation of whether prearrest silence is voluntary at a given
time may be impossible, "permitting any evidentiary use of
silence would undermine the fundamental Fifth Amendment
policy against coercion. ""'
In addition, the Court has stated that the privilege reflects
"our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual
balance... by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load,' "30' rather than re-
quiring the individual to provide the government with testimo-
nial evidence that the state was unable to procure by its own
devices. While the state may compel the defendant to provide
incriminating physical evidence, the Court has emphatically,
and colorfully, articulated the defendant's right not to cooper-
ate testimonially. In Watts v. Indiana,"7 for example, Justice
Jackson observed in his dissent that "any lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no state-
ment to police under any circumstances."' 8 According to Pro-
fessor Poulin, "[e]ven if the defendant is not confronting police
interrogation, the usual legal advice has been to make no
statement."3°9
On good advice from the Supreme Court, then, a defendant
may choose to remain silent in the prearrest setting. It would
violate the "state-individual balance" if the state is then per-
" Poulin, supra note 12, at 212.
' In United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991), discussed supra,
text accompanying notes 122-31, the defendant remained silent during the two and
one-half years between his initial contact with IRS criminal investigators and his
ultimate indictment. His initial silence was in response to the investigators re-
quest for information about an associate under investigation. Id. at 1200. It ap-
pears impossible to properly gauge the degree of "coercion" or "involuntariness" of
the subsequent two and one-half years of "silence."
30 Id.
" Poulin, supra note 12, at 212.
30 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citation omitted).
30 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
30 Id. at 59.
" Poulin, supra note 12 at 197 n.28.
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mitted to recast a defendant's privileged silence into testimoni-
al evidence and "substitute it for the testimonial admission
that the government was unable to obtain .... "310
Finally, if a defendant's prearrest silence can be constitu-
tionally admitted against him, the state enjoys unrestrained
control over when and how its constitutional obligations will
commence. After all, the Court has emphasized that "there is
no constitutional right to be arrested" and that law enforce-
ment "[is] under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a crimi-
nal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence
to establish probable cause."' 1 Therefore, the police, provided
their questioning is not custodial and does not "otherwise de-
prive [the defendant of] his freedom of action in any significant
way,"3 = can constitutionally prolong prearrest interrogation
in order to evade the Miranda and Doyle protections that ar-
rest of the defendant would trigger. Arming the police with a
device which permits the state to later recast a defendant's
prolonged prearrest refusal to "cooperate" into evidence against
him tips the "state-individual balance" dramatically in the
state's favor.
Neither the Miranda nor the Jenkins Court actually
weighed the impact of state action on these Fifth Amendment
policies. Indeed, the Miranda Court did not even mention the
impermissible-burden analysis, but instead simply cited Griffin
for the proposition that substantive use of newly privileged
custodial silence was categorically unconstitutional.313 This is
perhaps because the Court found the substantial nature of the
state's penalty to be obvious. As demonstrated, however, the
use of a defendant's privileged prearrest silence as evidence of
guilt against him offends basic policies underlying the privi-
lege. In addition, there is no discernable legitimate reason for
the state to use privileged silence as a substitute for the damn-
ing testimony that it was unable to obtain.3 ' Accordingly,
privileged prearrest silence is unconstitutionally burdened
when the state is permitted to comment on it at trial.
310 Poulin, supra note 12, at 211.
"* Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
"= Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, n.37.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
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IV. TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISTINGUISHING
PRIVILEGED FROM NON-PRIVILEGED PREARREST SILENCE
Part III of this Note argued that prearrest silence of the
sort in the prototype scenario,"'5 where John Doe is confront-
ed by state agents and indicates his unwillingness to speak or
answer questions, is privileged silence by virtue of Coercion
Model H.' 16 Part III further argued that prosecutorial com-
ment on privileged prearrest silence violates the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination because such com-
ment impermissibly burdens the right not to be a witness
against oneself in the prearrest setting.37
Assuming the Supreme Court eventually recognizes that
some instances of prearrest silence are constitutionally privi-
leged under Coercion Model II, it does not necessarily follow
that all silence occurring before arrest is privileged. Further-
more, the distinction between privileged and non-privileged
prearrest silence has important implications for potential crim-
inal defendants and their attorneys. As will be demonstrated,
the Court's current approach to Fifth Amendment impermissi-
ble-burden analysis suggests that any prearrest silence deemed
"non-privileged" will very likely remain constitutionally unpro-
tected from the prosecution's case-in-chief.
A. Prearrest Silence Not Resulting from Contact with Law
Enforcement is not Privileged
The factual circumstances of Jenkins v. Anderson"1 8 is an
example of silence not arising out of contact with law enforce-
ment. As was previously discussed,319 the Jenkins defendant
claimed at trial that he killed the victim in self-defense.32 In
addition, during the two weeks between the killing and his
315 The prototype scenario begins this Note.
316 See supra text accopanying notes 240-78, for a review of coercion analysis as
applied to prearrest silence.
317 See sdpra text accompanying notes 288-314 for a review of impermissible
burden analysis as applied to privileged prearrest silence.
318 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 85-102 for a complete discussion of
Jenkins.
3' Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 233.
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arrest, he had no contact with law enforcement." During
cross-examination, the prosecution questioned the defendant
about the fact that he waited two weeks to surrender to the
police, thereby attempting to impeach his credibility by sug-
gesting that he would have contacted the police immediately if
he had acted in self-defense.32
The Jenkins Court expressly declined to address whether
prearrest silence is privileged, but permitted prosecutorial use
of a defendant's silence where a defendant chose to testify at
trial." Nevertheless, even if the Jenkins defendant had not
testified at trial, the state action doctrine suggests that the
Supreme Court would not extend the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination to the Jenkins defendant's
prearrest silence.
It is axiomatic that the commands of the Constitution are
directed at governmental entities and that state action is a
prerequisite to the assertion of rights contained in the Fifth
Amendment."2 The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Our "involuntary confession" jurisprudence is entirely consistent
with the settled law requiring some sort of "state action" to support
a claim of violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... [furthermore, tlhere is obviously no reason to re-
quire more in the way of a "voluntariness" inquiry in the [Fifth
Amendment] waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment
confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment... is
governmental coercion. Indeed the Fifth Amendment privilege is not
concerned "with moral and psychological pressures to confess [or
incriminate oneselfi emanating from sources other than official coer-
cion. °in
A defendant who has no contact with law enforcement
prior to his arrest might nevertheless argue that prosecutorial
use of his prearrest "failure to come forward" satisfies the state
action requirement. For example, such a defendant might
claim that the choice not to come forward was induced by state
action in the sense that he feared the consequences that the
state might impose on him if he volunteered information. Simi-
331id.
321 Id.
Id. at 238.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1988).
Id. at 165 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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larly, he might claim that he knew that state agents were
investigating the crime in question and this investigation pre-
vented him from coming forward because he was afraid to
admit his knowledge, however innocent, of the crime.
Under these approaches, however, the defendant's reasons
for not coming forward more likely result from his own actions
or knowledge of facts relating to the crime rather than from
any intervening act on the part of the state. Any pressure to be
silent under such circumstances is best characterized as "moral
and psychological pressure[] to confess emanating from sources
other than offical coercion.3 2 6
Alternatively, a defendant who has no contact with law
enforcement prior to his arrest might argue that the state
action requirement is met by the trial court's later decision to
admit into evidence his incriminating prearrest "failure to
come forward." However, the Court has rejected this argument
for the presence of state action where the alleged state coercion
is temporally separated from testimonial evidence sought to be
excluded. 27
The Court explained:
The difficulty with [this] approach is that it fails to recognize the
essential link between coercive activity of the State, on the one
hand, and a resulting confession [or incriminating statements or
silence] by a defendant, on the other. The flaw in [this] constitution-
al argument is that it would... require that courts [] divine a
defendant's mbtivation for speaking or acting as he did even though
there be no claim that governmental conduct [at the time of the
statement or silence] coerced his decision.328
If a defendant has no contact with law enforcement prior to his
arrest, it follows from the Court's state action jurisprudence
that the privilege against self-incrimination does not attach to
the prearrest choice to remain silent.
At first blush, it may appear strange that the Jenkins
Court did not simply rule that prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's prearrest silence was constitutionally permissible
by virtue of the absence of state action compelling the choice of
silence in the prearrest setting. Indeed, while the Jenkins
326 Id. at 170.
32 Id. at 165-66.
32 Id.
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Court alluded to the state action doctrine in its rejection of the
defendant's due process claim," the Court did not even refer
to the state action doctrine in its discussion of the defendant's
Fifth Amendment claim. The likely reason the Court did not
rely on the state action doctrine in Jenkins, however, is that
prosecutorial comment on non-privileged prearrest silence
could still be unconstitutional by virtue of Impermissible-Bur-
den Test I. °
B. Application of Impermissible-Burden Test I: Non-Privileged
Silence
As demonstrated, prearrest silence not arising out of con-
tact with law enforcement is not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment because the prearrest choice to speak or to remain
silent is not compelled by a state actor."s If the silence is
not privileged, the state is constitutionally barred from com-
menting on it only if this prearrest evidence 2 impermissibly
burdens the defendant's right not to take the stand at trial
(Impermissible-Burden Test I). This shift in focus from the
prearrest choice of silence to the trial choice of silence is man-
dated by the Court, which has unambiguously held that bur-
den analysis applies only to burdened constitutional rights.'
In addition, this shift in focus has enormous implications re-
garding the likelihood of a finding of a constitutional violation.
Application of an impermissible-burden analysis to non-privi-
leged prearrest silence demonstrates this point.
29 Commencing its rejection of the defendant's due process claim, the Jenkins
Court noted that "in this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to
remain silent before arrest." Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-40 for an introduction of Impermissi-
ble-Burden Test I.
32 See supra text accompanying notes 324-28.
Where pre arrest silence is not privileged, the silence itself has no special
constitutional status and will be subjected to traditional admissibility scrutiny
under applicable evidentiary law. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240 (after declining to
find pre-arrest silence privileged, the Court stated that "[e]ach jurisdiction remains
free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is
viewed as more probative than prejudicial').
'= South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
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i. Burden on the Exercise of the Right to Trial Silence
Consider this scenario. Defendant John Doe's prearrest
silence is not constitutionally privileged. However, he has a
constitutional right to remain silent at trial. Doe learns from
his attorney that his prearrest silence may be admitted against
him at trial under applicable evidentiary rules. Realizing the
prejudicial effect that the prosecution's comment on his
prearrest silence may have on the jury, Doe decides that he
should testify at trial in order to explain to the jury why he
remained silent before arrest.
From this scenario we may conclude that Doe's constitu-
tional right not to testify at trial was burdened, perhaps
impermissibly. He feels the need to explain himself because of
the inculpatory evidence of his prearrest silence. However, the
Court has made clear that "the Constitution does not forbid
'every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that
has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights.' "334
The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected
the notion "that the mere force of evidence is compulsion of the
sort forbidden by the privilege."33 5 Indeed, all inculpatory evi-
dence is prejudicial. The state has no interest in presenting
only a flattering image of the defendant, nor is it required to
do so. Once inculpatory evidence is admitted under applicable
evidentiary law, it will often have the effect of discouraging the
defendant's constitutional right to trial silence. The fact that
the defendant may be persuaded to speak at trial in order to
counter the state's damning evidence is merely a definition of
the adversarial process. Prearrest silence, like any damning
evidence, encourages the defendant to forgo his constitutional
right to trial silence.
Under Impermissible-Burden Test I, analysis must focus
on whether burdening the defendant's choice of trial silence
impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies of the
rights involved."3 ' However, at trial, the defendant does not
's' Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30
(1973)).
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236.
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face the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, peijury, or contempt.
Griffin resolved the trilemna by forbidding any negative infer-
ence to be drawn from trial silence. Likewise, the fair state-
individual balance is maintained, because, under Griffin, the
state is not permitted to turn a defendant's trial silence into
the testimonial admission that it was unable to obtain from its
own efforts.
Finally, the fear that the silence was coerced or involun-
tary evaporates when burden analysis focuses on silence at
trial. At trial, every criminal defendant is privileged not only
to remain silent, but also to testify in his own defense.' It is
the duty of the defendant's attorney to inform him of this fact.
The judge, jury, and general public see the defendant in the
courtroom and may observe if his trial silence is due to physi-
cal compulsion exerted by the state. Even in the event that the
defendant's choice of silence at trial was morally or psycholog-
ically compelled through blackmail or threats on the part of
the state, the remedy for such a violation would properly be a
retrial of the defendant and criminal sanctions against the
threateners. The fact that some cases may exist where state
agents have threatened the defendant into not testifying surely
does not mean that the defendant's trial choice is always com-
pelled.
If prearrest silence is found not to be privileged and is
used by the prosecution as inculpatory evidence, then the bur-
den on the right to trial silence is analytically equivalent to
the burden that always exists when the defendant decides not
to testify in the face of inculpatory evidence against him.
ii. -Legitimacy of Comment on Non-Privileged Prearrest
Silence
The state has an interest in presenting inculpatory evi-
dence from which a jury may conclude the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. As previously noted, this interest is
legitimate when the evidence is admissible under applicable
evidentiary law and does not violate a constitutional man-
date.' If prearrest silence is not privileged under the Fifth
"' See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
313 29 AM. Juu. 2D Evidence § 251 (1967).
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Amendment, then using the fact of such silence is at least
facially legitimate because evidentiary law generally permits
such evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence will be used as a
model in demonstrating this point.
In general, a declarant's out-of-court statement is inadmis-
sible as hearsay if it is offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.339 Under this general rule, using a
defendant's prearrest speech or silence" occurring before ar-
rest is inadmissible when the state attempts to use this state-
ment to support the facts contained in it. Prearrest silence in
the face of police questioning, for example, could not be used
by the prosecution as evidence of a denial of a fact, or as a
tacit admission of a fact.
However, admissions by party opponents are not hear-
say."' In addition, there are significant statutory and com-
mon law exceptions to the hearsay rule. The common feature of
these exceptions is that such statements are "offered as evi-
dence of a material fact" and have "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness."' Thus a police report written at or near
the time of questioning, provided it was made "in the course of
a regularly conducted business activity," may be admitted as
trial evidence.' In addition, a defendant's statement or si-
lence duly noted in the police report may be admissible as
"hearsay included within hearsay"3" as long as the statement
is offered to show the defendant's "then existing state of mind,
emotion... [sluch as intent, plan, motive, design .... "35 A
defendant's prearrest statement "I refuse to talk to you guys"
cleary meets the exception to the hearsay rule and would be
admitted.
These exceptions to the hearsay rule demonstrate a con-
sensus regarding the legitimacy of using out of court declara-
tions as substantive evidence of guilt so long as there is a
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness and the statement
FED. R EVID. Rule 801(c).
"' See infra text accompanying notes 221-22 for a review of the Supreme
CourlVs treatment of silence as testimony.
UI FED. R EVID. Rule 801(c).
FED. R. EVID. Rule 803(24).
FED. R EVlD. Rule 803(6).
FED. R. EVID. Rule 805.
'"FED. R. EVIlD. Rule 803(3).
[Vol. 63: 897
1997] NON-TESTIIYING DEFENDANTS PRSARREST SILENCE 953
is offered as evidence of a material fact. Of course, a trial judge
may ultimately deem the evidence of prearrest silence inad-
missible on grounds of irrelevance or undue prejudice. But, as
the Jenkins Court stated, the question of whether a given piece
of evidence is relevant or unduly prejudicial "is a question of
state [or federal] evidentiary law." 6 In the six circuit court
cases surveyed in Part H, the trial courts obviously concluded
that the respective defendants' prearrest silence was both rele-
vant and probative.
A defendant's constitutional right to remain silent at trial
is always burdened when inculpatory evidence is admitted
against him. If prearrest silence does not arise out of contact
with law enforcement and is therefore non-privileged, the
prearrest silence would be evaluated like any other piece of
evidence. In addition, using prearrest silence at trial is not
facially prohibited under evidentiary law. Accordingly, trial use
of non-privileged prearrest silence does not unconstitutionally
burden the right to trial silence.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the privilege against self-in-
crimination attaches to the prearrest setting whenever state
action compels an individual to choose between incriminating
himself by speaking or incriminating himself by silence. In
such a prearrest setting, the individual faces a dilemma com-
parable to the historic cruel trilemma which the privilege was
intended to prevent. The United States Supreme Court should
address the circuit split on this issue and resolve the prearrest
dilemma in the same way it has resolved the dilemma in court-
room and custodial settings: the speech may be constitutionally
admitted into evidence while the silence should be constitu-
tionally protected from comment in the prosecution's case-in-
chief.
Michael R. Patrick
" Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239.

